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Abstract: This article challenges the received wisdom that French public 
opinion was infused with pacifist sentiment during the 1930s, and that this 
sentiment in turn contributed to the French defeat of 1940. It will suggest 
that French public attitudes towards the prospect of war can be better 
defined as ‘war anxiety’ rather than the value-laden term ‘pacifist’. Taking as 
a test case the period between the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and 
the outbreak of the Second World War less than a year later, the article will 
tease out the necessary distinction between ‘pacifism’ and ‘war anxiety’. By 
employing a notion of ‘representations’ of public opinion, it will be shown 
how French opinion was demonstrably less pacifist than many existing 
analyses assume. Instead, it will be contended that the public’s anxieties 
with regard to a future war manifested themselves in a variety of ways, of 
which pacifism was merely one marginal example. Indeed, ‘war anxiety’ 
increasingly demanded that France prepare for an inevitable conflict, in stark 
contrast to simply retreating into a defeatist mindset and thus establishing 
the conditions for the defeat in 1940. 
 
 
Pacifism is widely regarded to have been a defining characteristic of public 
attitudes towards the prospect of war in interwar France.1 French foreign 
                                                 
1 Pacifism was evoked, either explicitly or implicitly, in several of the earliest autopsies of 
the French defeat of 1940, including A. Werth, The Twilight of France, 1933-1940, (New 
York, 1966 [1942]), C. Micaud, The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939: A Study of 
Public Opinion, (New York, 1964 [1943]) and M. Bloch, L’étrange défaite: témoignage écrit en 
1940, (Paris, 1946). It has consistently been alluded to in the subsequent historiography, 
notably L. Mysyrowicz, Autopsie d’une défaite: origines de l’effondrement militaire français de 
1940, (Lausanne, 1973), J.-B. Duroselle, La décadence, 1932-1939, (Paris, 1979), J.-P. 
Azéma, De Munich à la libération, 1938-1944, (Paris, 2002 [1979]), E. Weber, The hollow 
years: France in the 1930s, (New York, 1996), and J. Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi 
Invasion of 1940, (Oxford, 2003). Analyses focusing on French opinion also emphasize the 
prevalence of pacifism, including J.-L. Crémieux-Brilhac Les Français de l’an 40, 2 vols, 
(Paris, 1990), P. Laborie, L’opinion française sous Vichy, (Paris, 1990) and Y. Lacaze, 
L’opinion publique française et la crise de Munich, (Bern, 1991). Several works focus on 
pacifism itself, notable N. Ingram, The Politics of Dissent: Pacifism in France, 1919-1939, 
(Oxford, 1991), F.-G. Dreyfus, ‘Le pacifisme en France, 1930-1940’, in M. Vaïsse (ed.), Le 
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policy-makers, it is argued, were constrained by a profoundly pacifist 
French populace, desperate to avoid war. This article, however, will argue 
that the term ‘pacifism’ has been too broadly applied to interwar French 
public opinion and thus fails to explain sufficiently public attitudes to war. 
Specifically, the negative connotations of pacifism – namely fear of war, 
unwillingness to fight, defeatism, and even collaborationism – were less  
widespread in 1930s France than the notion of a pacifist-infused masses 
implies. In its place, a broader concept of ‘war anxiety’ will be developed. 
Less rigid than ‘pacifism’, ‘war anxiety’ is more applicable to sections of 
French opinion that feared war but were not ‘pacifist’ in the doctrinal sense 
of term. ‘War anxiety’ incorporates not only ‘pacifist’ tendencies of opinion 
but also those less easily identifiable, politicized or voluble tendencies 
regarding the prospect of war. A concept of war anxiety is beneficial as it 
encompasses a diverse range of sentiments and opinions, and thus better 
reflects the nuances of French opinion.2  
Essentially, they are two defining characteristics of war anxiety: 
firstly, it was inspired by the prevailing sentiment that the Great War must 
never be repeated; secondly, it was founded upon an acute unease regarding 
the potential repercussions of another conflict. Indeed, it the term ‘next war 
anxiety’ is arguably more accurate, reflecting the concern that technological 
advancements since 1914-18, particularly in terms of air power, meant that 
the next war would be more destructive than the last. This article will 
                                                                                                                                                        
pacifisme en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1950, (Brussels, 1993) and J.-P. Biondi, 
La mêlée des pacifistes, 1914-1945, (Paris, 2000). Finally, a number of works discuss 
pacifism within certain sections of French society, such as war veterans (A. Prost, Les 
anciens combattants et la société français, 3 vols, (Paris, 1977), esp. vol. 3, mentalités et 
idéologies,), intellectuals (J.-F. Sirinelli, Génération intellectuelle: Khâgneux et Normaliens 
dans l’entre-deux-guerres, (Paris, 1994 [1988])), the role of women in the pacifist movement 
(S. Reynolds, France between the Wars: Gender and Politics, (London, 1996)), and 
schoolteachers (M. Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of France: Education, Patriotism and 
Pacifism, 1914-1940, (Cambridge, 2004)). Pacifism within the French peasantry has also 
been explored (I. Boussard, ‘Le pacifisme paysan’, in R. Rémond and J. Bourdin (eds.), La 
France et les Français, 1938-1939,(Paris, 1978), pp. 59-75, as has the impact of pacifist 
sentiment amongst French socialists (R. Gombin, ‘Socialisme et pacifisme’ in La France et 
les Français, pp. 245-260 and M. Bilis, Socialistes et pacifists, 1933-1939: ou l’intenable 
dilemma des socialistes français, (Paris, 1979)). 
2 Norman Ingram has noted the semantic debate on the use of the term, with the French 
concept of pacifism being more all-encompassing than the Anglo-Saxon usage, which tends 
to be more value-laden. N. Ingram, ‘Repressed Memory Syndrome: Interwar French Pacifism 
and the Attempt to Recover France’s Pacifist Past’, French History, 18 (2004), p. 316. 
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examine war anxiety in the period between the Munich Agreement in 
September 1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War less than a year 
later. This period is crucial as it is widely argued that Munich marked the 
zenith of French pacifism, an argument that initially took hold in the early 
years of the war. In 1941, Louis Lévy wrote how, ‘At the time of Munich, all 
the hidden pacifism that had lain in the hearts of some of the working-class 
leaders came to the surface’.3 Similarly, the apparent ‘hardening’ of public 
opinion after Munich is often equated with a diminution of pacifist 
sentiment.4  
However, although doctrinal pacifism certainly lost ground after 
Munich, it would be misleading to assume that all anxieties regarding a 
future conflict had vanished. War anxiety remained, only now it dictated 
that French policymakers adopt a firmer posture, deterring the dictators 
whilst simultaneously preparing France for war. Consequently, although 
war anxiety was still a constraint, it did not induce the defeatism so often 
associated with pacifism. By 1939, perceptions of public opinion held by the 
policymaking elites no longer compelled them to avoid a policy of firmness 
against the dictators. On the contrary, war anxiety demanded a concerted 
effort to prepare the nation for an impending conflict.  
 
I 
 
In order to analyse public attitudes towards the prospect of war, it is 
essential to both develop a methodological framework with which to 
understand the troublesome concept of public opinion. Evidently, ‘public 
opinion’ can emanate from a diverse array of groups and organisations 
throughout society. Nevertheless, approaching the question via a notion of 
representations can reveal how certain tendencies of opinion assumed a 
                                                 
3 L. Lévy, TheTtruth about France, translated by W. Pickles, (London, 1941), p. 119. This 
interpretation remains prominent, particularly the assumption that Munich was the 
‘apogee’ of pacifism. See J.-P. Azéma, De Munich à la liberation, pp. 12-22. See also J. 
Jackson, The Fall of France, pp. 147-149, for a similar viewpoint. 
4 Indeed, it is commonly argued that the decline of pacifism began in the mid-1930s. A. 
Adamthwaite, for example, suggests that ‘pacifism waned after 1936’. Grandeur and Misery: 
France’s Bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940, (New York, 1995), p. 169. 
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dominant position, not only transcending and marginalizing others, but 
often concealing them altogether.5 To an extent, such a methodology 
borrows from Pierre Laborie, who suggests that using representation as an 
historical tool enables one to identify, within the multifarious expressions of 
opinion, how specific dominant tendencies emerge, around which ‘a 
common notion of opinion’ can be identified. This shared perception of 
opinion allows the historian to ‘define the historical status of the 
phenomena of opinion, and its place in the explanatory processes’.6 
Identifying dominant tendencies of opinion through the prism of 
representations enables a more sophisticated analytical framework to 
emerge, illustrating how the intangible phenomena of opinion was reduced 
to a more manageable series of dominant representations. 
This article will consider two distinct categories of representation 
through which French public opinion in the late 1930s was perceived by the 
decision-making elites. Firstly, ‘reactive’ representations of opinion; that is, 
the immediate and spontaneous reactions of the public to 
circumstances/events as they occur. These forms of representation can 
include the contemporary press, recent police reports on the state of 
opinion, election results, an analysis of political leaflets, posters and 
pamphlets in current circulation, and the conversations, gossip, 
correspondence and rumours within social networks of friends, family and 
colleagues. This category of representations therefore reflects how public 
opinion is fluid, constantly in transition, fluctuating and diverse. Secondly, 
there are certain ‘residual’ representations, which can be defined as the 
remnants of previous memories and experiences, the more general 
tendencies of opinion considered characteristic of previous years, even 
previous decades. These lack the specificity of the contemporary, reactive 
                                                 
5 The study of representations has been pioneered largely within the disciplines of sociology 
and psychology. For a good introduction to these theoretical approaches, see S. Moscovici, 
‘The phenomenon of social representations’, in S. Moscovici (ed.) Social Representations: 
Explorations in Social Psychology, (Cambridge, 2000 [1981]), and 5 S. Hall, ‘The Work of 
Representation’, in S. Hall (ed.), Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices, (London, 1997). 
6 P. Laborie, Les Français des années troubles, (Paris, 2003), p. 38. 
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representations, but nonetheless retained sufficient power to be habitually 
projected onto perceptions of current opinion. 
It is within this category of representation that pacifism was 
prominent. Such was the pervasiveness of the idea that French society had 
assumed a pacifist tinge following the carnage and horror of the Great War 
that it formed a potent ‘residual’ representation of public opinion, 
persuading the policymaking elites that French opinion remained pacifist 
throughout the interwar years. It was thus difficult to conceive that the 
majority of the people would, just twenty years later, have abandoned this 
sentiment to the extent that they would favour resistance to appeasement. 
This article will suggest that residual representations of opinion can be 
overemphasized, interpreted in such a way as to distort reality by means of 
a dominant and vocal minority providing formative representations that are 
subsequently projected onto the wider corpus of opinion. As Jean-Noël 
Jeanneney asserts, ‘the intense opinion of an active minority often exerts 
more pressure on proceedings than the half-hearted reactions of an 
indifferent majority’.7 Moreover, such a residual representation can become 
so pervasive that it retains a potentially unrepresentative influence, 
stubbornly refusing to yield to the changes and fluctuations of opinion(s) in 
response to the progression of time and events. Indeed, they become, to 
borrow from James Joll, ‘unspoken assumptions’.8   
 In interwar France, pacifism was a peculiarly pervasive 
representation of public opinion. It is widely held that French opinion was, if 
not pacifist, certainly infused with an anxiety regarding the prospect of war. 
However, clearly differentiating between pacifism and a more widespread 
anxiety regarding the ‘next’ war facilitates a more accurate understanding of 
the public’s apprehensions regarding the prospect of war. Of particular 
interest here is the prospect of aerial bombardment, and how technological 
advancements since the Great War meant that any future conflict would be 
                                                 
7 J.-N. Jeanneney, Une histoire des médias, (Paris), p. 16. 
8 J. Joll, 1914: The Unspoken Assumptions, an inaugural lecture delivered 25 April 1968 at 
the London School of Economics and Political Science, (London, 1968). See also, Z. Steiner, 
‘Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office before the Great War’, in B. J. C. McKercher 
and D. J. Moss (eds.), Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895-1939: Memorial 
Essays Honouring C. J. Lowe, (Edmonton, 1984), pp. 19-55. 
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even more devastating. Robert Young has noted that ‘literature on the 
subject of air war rarely use[d] Berlin as a figurative example of an air 
target. Rather, the French used Tours, or Dijon, or Reims, or, especially, 
Paris’.9 Similarly, Robert Paxton notes that, ‘War meant poison gas and the 
bombing of cities. Paris would be worse than Guernica’.10  
 However, such fears are better characterized as manifestations of 
war anxiety rather than pacifism. In contradistinction from pacifism, war 
anxiety was neither an explicit fear of war nor a deeply-held conviction that 
war was unjustifiable. Similarly it would not automatically manifest itself as 
defeatism in the event of war. This distinction between pacifism and war-
anxiety – or more accurately, anxiety as regards the ‘next war’ – is one that 
needs to be made. It is rather crude simply to label the desire for peace as 
pacifism (in all its guises, ideological, doctrinal, religious etc.). Therefore, it 
is reasonable to suggest that as war became increasingly likely, the 
distinction between pacifism and a more intangible ‘anxiety’, or even ‘fear’ of 
war became more conspicuous. Such an anxiety was arguably far more 
widespread than pacifism, in the stricter definition of the term. Moreover, it 
was shared by the public and policymaking elites alike. 
Therefore, during the period 1938-9, the marginalization of doctrinal 
pacifism ensured that the residual representation of widespread French 
pacifism was gradually superseded. This did not, however, occur rapidly, as 
the idea of a pacifist French society was particularly entrenched. During the 
preceding years, pacifist doctrine had been espoused by numerous pacifist 
organizations, politicians and within the popular press. Consequently, the 
sentiments of a vocal minority were perceived to be a mirror of mainstream 
opinion. This is, of course, unsurprising, as the aftermath of the First World 
War provided a perfect environment in which pacifism could flourish, 
nurturing a deep-rooted conviction that it never be repeated. The pre-war 
representation of war as patriotic, of ‘Mourir pour la patrie, c’est le sort le 
                                                 
9 R. Young, ‘The Use and Abuse of Fear: France and the Air Menace in the 1930s’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 2 (1987), p. 103. Similarly, Mysyrowicz suggests that ‘The 
idea of peace, built on the terror of aerial and chemical warfare, persisted until the epoch of 
Munich’, Autopsie d’une défaite, pp. 177-178. 
10 R. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, (New York, 1982), p. 11. 
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plus beau’,11 was dramatically superseded. As Antoine Prost has observed, 
war was now represented as horrifically modern, reflecting the technological 
advancements made since the Great War.12 Pacifism also permeated cinema, 
literature and radio,13 whilst pacifist doctrine was vocally advocated within 
the legions of anciens combattants14, the teaching profession15 and amongst 
students.16 Above all, a visceral hatred of war emerged from the bitter 
experiences of 1914-18, the unprecedented loss of life, and the concomitant 
physical and psychological scars.  
Consequently, at a time of profound ideological polarisation, French 
society has been represented as unanimous only in the shared conviction 
‘Surtout pas de guerre’.17 But a fundamental problem arises from the 
tendency to equate pacifism with defeatism. The distinction between the two 
concepts is too often blurred, stemming partly from attempts to use the 
history of the interwar period as an explanatory tool with which to analyse 
the defeat of 1940. Indeed, within the vibrant historiography of the fall of 
France, the ‘decadence’ thesis implicitly suggests that the seeds of moral 
decay, sown in the legacy of the Great War and nourished throughout the 
interwar period, resulted in a ‘decadent’ France, infused with defeatism, 
                                                 
11 From a popular military hymn of the First World War, cited in C. Rearick, The French in 
Love and War: Popular Culture in the Era of the World Wars, (New Haven, 1997), p. 1. 
12 A. Prost, Republican Identities in War and Peace: Representations of France in the 19
th 
and 
20
th 
Centuries, translated by J. Winter and H. McPhail, (Oxford, 2002), p. 98. 
13 E. G. Strebel, for example, claims that French cinema ‘contributed to a defeatist 
mentality, to a psychological acceptance of the Munich agreements and to the 1940 defeat’. 
‘Political Polarisation and French Cinema, 1934-39’, in N. Pronay and D. W. Spring (eds.), 
Propaganda, Politics and Film, 1918-45, (London, 1982). See also Rearick, The French in 
Love and War, pp. 220-241. Similarly, popular literature recalled the horrors of the last war 
and predicted the even more catastrophic consequences of the next. See Mysyrowicz, 
Autopsie d’une défaite, pp. 278-304. Elsewhere, Crémieux-Brilhac has argued that radio 
perpetuated fears of the ‘next’ war by graphically portraying the devastation of aerial 
bombardment, Les Français de l’An 40, tome I: La guerre, oui ou non? p. 85. 
14 For pacifism among French war veterans, see Prost, Les anciens combattants, iii. 
15 Weber, The Hollow Years, p. 20. Mona Siegel concludes that the teachers’ pacifist 
leanings became ‘a matter of political importance to the entire nation’, ‘‘To the Unknown 
Mother of the Unknown Soldier’: Pacifism, Feminism, and the Politics of Sexual Difference 
among French Institutrices between the Wars’, French Historical Studies, 22 (1999), p. 429. 
See also idem, The Moral Disarmament of France. 
16 J. Jackson, The Fall of France, pp. 147-148. Jean-François Sirinelli notes how the 
pacifism within the Écoles Normales ‘remained solidly established’ throughout the 1930s. 
Génération intellectuelle, p. 534. 
17 This observation was notably made by Duroselle in La décadence, p. 169. 
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simply unable to meet the demands of modern war.18 Implicitly or explicitly, 
such analyses suggest that pacifism left the nation psychologically 
unprepared, riddled with defeatist sentiment.  
Although revisionist and post-revisionist interpretations have 
challenged this thesis,19 the impact of pacifism continues to be given 
prominence, as many of those who generally refute the more critical 
conclusions of the decadence school continue to suggest that pacifism 
contributed to the politics of the French defeat. Julian Jackson, for example, 
suggests that France emerged from the Great War a ‘profoundly pacifist 
society’, the zenith of which was the Munich Agreement of September 1938. 
Similarly, François-Georges Dreyfus has written that French policy-makers 
were conscious of a ‘latent pacifism and refusal of war’, thus contributing to 
‘the defeat, the acceptance of an armistice, and the Vichy regime’.20  
Such analyses invariably use pacifism as a ‘catch-all’ term, 
encompassing many diverse sentiments regarding the prospect of war. 
However, several analyses provide more sophisticated arguments, 
distinguishing between different varieties of French pacifism.21 More 
specifically, Mona Siegel’s analysis of the pacifism of French schoolteachers 
reveals not only how different forms of pacifism infused their politics, but 
                                                 
18 The best-known expression of this argument is Duroselle’s La décadence, although the 
fundamental tenets of the argument are forwarded more systematically elsewhere, notably 
in A. Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, (London, 1979), P. 
Wandycz, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1932-1936, (Princeton, 1988) and N. 
Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe: The Dilemmas of French Impotence, 1919-
1940, (Cambridge, 1992). Weber’s descriptive account of French society in the 1930s, The 
Hollow Years, also lends itself to the decadence thesis. 
19 For a more detailed overview of the historiography, see P. Jackson, ‘Returning to the Fall 
of France: Recent Work on the Causes and Consequences of the “Strange Defeat” of 1940’, 
Modern & Contemporary France, 12 (2004), 513-536. 
20 J. Jackson, The Fall of France, pp. 147-149; Dreyfus, ‘Le pacifisme en France’, p. 144. 
21 Ingram distinguishes between a pacifisme ancien style, essentially an ideological pacifism 
prominent during the 1920s, and a more ideologically motivated pacifisme nouveau style 
that emerged in the 1930s. The Politics of Dissent, p. 8. Ingram’s pacifisme ancien style can 
be considered akin to the category of ideological pacifists identified by Roger Chickering in 
his study of German pacifism prior to World War One, Imperial Germany and a World 
Without War: The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914, (Princeton, 1975), whilst 
pacifism nouveau style can be seen as resembling the utopian pacifists of Chickering’s 
analysis. Ingram also identifies a third strand, ‘feminist pacifism’.  See idem, ‘“Nous allons 
vers les monastères”: French Pacifism and the Crisis of the Second World War’, in M. S. 
Alexander and K. Mouré (eds.), Crisis and Renewal in France, 1918-1962, (Oxford, 2002), p. 
133. Others who distinguish between various forms of pacifism include Biondi, La mêlée 
des pacifistes, p. 141 and Dreyfus, ‘Le pacifisme en France’, p. 139. 
9 
 
also how they manifested themselves as a ‘patriotic pacifism’, encapsulating 
a widespread disdain for war without undermining loyalty to the Republic.22 
Furthermore, Siegel rightly notes that French schoolteachers’ pacifism did 
not foster ‘an atmosphere of decadence’; by contrast, their patriotic pacifism 
helps explain why, when the ‘Republic was directly threatened, French men 
and women overwhelmingly rallied to its defence’.23   
Although numerous varieties of pacifism have been detected, the 
tendency to employ a more nebulous conception is problematic. The 
multifaceted nature of public opinion means that employing such 
terminology inevitably results in over-simplification. Pacifism is simply a 
single term used to describe multifarious attitudes. As Pierre Laborie 
observes, the only area of convergence is the aspiration for peace.24 War 
anxiety, therefore, is a better label for such a multitude of attitudes, 
avoiding the over-simplification that ensues when applying the more value-
laden term ‘pacifism’. Indeed, Norman Ingram has alluded to a similar 
concept in defining the pacifisme nouveau style that emerged in the late 
1920s, suggesting that it was partially defined by an anxiety regarding the 
next war.25 Pacifism, he suggests, was appealing by virtue of the ‘increasing 
sense that another war could destroy civilization because of the progress 
made by science and technology since the end of the Great War’.26  
Ingram’s analysis is informed by Martin Ceadel’s typology, particularly 
the latter’s definition of the ‘modern-war pacifists’ who argued that just wars 
were no longer possible ‘in view of the indiscriminate destructiveness of 
modern technology’.27 Consequently, ‘modern-war pacifists’ were ‘the first to 
believe that it was possible to show, on a utilitarian calculation of the likely 
pros and cons, that no future war could ever be worth fighting’.28 Borrowing 
from Ceadel, Ingram provides a conceptual distinction between different 
varieties of French pacifism. However, Ingram’s conceptual framework is 
                                                 
22 Siegel, The Moral Disarmament of France, p. 227. 
23 Ibid. p. 227. 
24 Laborie, L’Opinion française sous Vichy, pp. 87-89. For more on the diversity of pacifism, 
see Biondi’s appropriately titled La mêlée des pacifistses. 
25 Ingram, The Politics of Dissent, p. 129. 
26 Ibid. p. 127. 
27 M. Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War, (Oxford, 1988), p. 143. 
28 Ibid. pp. 151-152. 
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applied only to overtly pacifist organisations rather than mainstream French 
opinion, resulting in an analysis explicitly confined to ‘those men, women 
and organizations in interwar France for whom peace was a primary, 
consistent, and overriding concern and goal’.29 War anxiety, however, was 
not confined to these individuals or organizations. Attachment to peace was 
widespread in interwar France and it is therefore essential that the 
application of war anxiety is not confined to those with a developed and 
politicized pacifism.  
Equally, it is imperative to avoid interpreting all manifestations of war 
anxiety as pacifism. A concept of war anxiety benefits from a definitional 
clarity, and is thus better suited to explaining the more general attitudes of 
the French public towards the prospect of war. In particular, it avoids the 
negative implications of pacifism, notably the belief that pacifists are ‘scared’ 
of war. Although many dreaded the devastation of the ‘next war’, many 
would choose to fight if the territorial integrity of France was at stake. War 
anxiety was not confined to doctrinal pacifists, as the majority of French 
men and women during the interwar years would have unhesitatingly 
expressed a desire to avoid war. As Prost notes, this was true of nearly all 
ex-soldiers. However, Prost cannot resist equating this desire with pacifism 
and, moreover, projecting it onto the entirety of French opinion: ‘the whole of 
France was pacifist, and this pacifism was the reason why France did not 
oppose Hitler earlier’.30 
Most analyses of the late Third Republic implicitly suggest that 
pacifism contributed both to the capitulation at Munich in 1938 and the 
French defeat in 1940. Indeed, the term ‘pacifism’ immediately conjures up 
such negative associations. War anxiety can thus prove beneficial in moving 
beyond such connotations, facilitating a study of public attitudes towards 
the prospect of war on their own terms, rather than through the prism of the 
1940 defeat. Moreover, it accounts for the fact that the number of integral or 
absolute pacifists was always relatively small, leading Ingram to describe his 
                                                 
29 Ingram, The Politics of Dissent, p. 8. 
30 Prost, ‘The Impact of War on French and German Political Cultures’, The Historical 
Journal, 37 (1994), p. 210. 
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study of French pacifism as dealing ‘with the politics of the margins’.31 By 
contrast, war anxiety was not confined to the margins, although it was often 
difficult to distinguish it from the vocal representations of opinion 
emanating from marginal pacifist movements. Nevertheless, by 1938-9, 
reactive representations of public opinion demonstrated that war anxiety 
was more pronounced than pacifism. Consequently, it helps us to 
understand how the Daladier government was able to adopt a politique de 
fermeté without outrunning a seemingly pacifist public opinion. 
 
II 
 
In the period of 1938 preceding the Munich Agreement, reactive 
representations of opinion continued to reinforce the residual representation 
of widespread pacifist sentiment. Police reports conveyed numerous 
examples of the integral pacifism embraced by a small minority. At a 
meeting of the Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix (LICP) on 31 
March 1938, Guy Jernan, of the Anciens Combattants Pacifistes, argued that 
‘the independence of Czechoslovakia must not be a motive for war’.32 
Although the LICP was a marginal organisation, such reactive 
representations served to reinforce the residual perception of a pacifist 
French public. However, it was not only doctrinal pacifists who were deeply 
unsettled by the prospect of war. As Norman Ingram has noted, ‘In a 
country which had borne the brunt of the Great War public opinion and 
politicians alike took seriously the pacifist cry ‘plus jamais ça!’’33 
As the Czechoslovakian crisis threatened to escalate into war, the 
residual representation of pacifism constrained French policymakers. 
Moreover, contemporary events exacerbated a more widespread war anxiety. 
The horror and revulsion provoked by the news and imagery of modern 
warfare in Spain heightened the conviction that such events must not be 
                                                 
31 Ingram, The Politics of Dissent, pp. 15-16. 
32 A[rchives] de la P[réfecture] de la P[olice], BA/1777: Police report, 31 March – meeting 
organized by the LICP, 30 March 1938. For more on the LICP, see Ingram, The Politics of 
Dissent, passim. 
33 Ingram, ‘“Nous allons vers les monastères”’, p. 133. 
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allowed to occur in France. Newsreels, photo-journalism and evocative 
newspaper articles graphically relayed the horrors of war to the French 
people. The French Premier, Édouard Daladier was not immune to these 
anxieties. In a speech of 16 June 1938, he referred to the bombings in Spain 
as ‘an attack on civilisation itself’, lamenting the loss of ‘centuries of heritage 
and thousands of innocent lives’.34 
 War anxiety greatly influenced public and political reactions to the 
Czechoslovakian crisis, particularly as there was no guarantee of British 
assistance in the event of a conflict with Germany. As the British 
ambassador in Paris, Sir Eric Phipps, noted, there was ‘a strong movement 
in right circles against France fighting for Czechoslovakia unless assured of 
British support’.35 Such concerns were not confined to the political right. As 
Lacaze observes, ‘in the summer of 1938 the press continued to give all its 
support to Franco-British cooperation’.36 For all, the spectre of war loomed 
on the horizon, and the potential repercussions of a future European 
conflict weighed heavily. The American Ambassador, William Bullitt, 
encapsulated the prevailing mood when informing President Roosevelt that, 
‘if war should begin, the result would be such a devastation of Europe that it 
would make small difference which side should emerge the ostensible 
victor’.37 
 Unsurprising, the willingness of the French public to go to war on 
behalf of Czechoslovakia was questioned. The British Military Attaché in 
Paris, Colonel William Fraser, had his doubts: ‘Whether or not the French 
are prepared to fight seems a little uncertain’. He also referred to the view of 
the Embassy’s press attaché, Charles Mendl, who was ‘most emphatic in his 
opinion that the French will not fight except in self-defence’.38 Undoubtedly, 
certain influential circles in France were vocally hostile to intervention on 
                                                 
34 Archives d’histoire contemporaine, Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po, Fonds Roger 
Genebrier, GE6: Allocution de M. Daladier, Président du Conseil, au Comité Exécutif du 
Parti radical socialiste, 15 June 1938. 
35 T[he] N[ational] A[rchives], FO 371/21599/C3388/55/17: Phipps to Halifax, 24 April 
1938. 
36 Lacaze, L’opinion publique française et la crise de Munich, p. 197. 
37 Bullitt to Roosevelt, 31 August 1938, in O. H. Bullitt (ed.), For the President, Personal and 
Secret: Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, (Boston, 1972), 
p. 283. 
38 TNA, WO 106/5413: Fraser to van Cutsem, 31 August 1938. 
13 
 
behalf of the Czechoslovakians, providing a voluble reactive representation 
of French opinion. The press were pivotal in furnishing such 
representations, not least following the publication on 7 September of a 
notorious leading article in The Times advocating the cession of the Sudeten 
areas to Germany. This article provoked considerable debate in the pages of 
the French press, with several writers applauding the stance taken by the 
London paper. Émile Roche, director of the Radical newspaper, La 
République, had already made such a suggestion the previous day, and cited 
the Times article with approval on both the 8th and the 9th of September. The 
leader of the far-right Parti populaire français, Jacques Doriot, in La Liberté, 
and Stéphane Lauzanne, chief editor of Le Matin, did likewise on 9 
September, while Léon Bailby provided further favourable comment in the 
Jour-Écho de Paris on 10 September.   
Similar reactive representations were provided by Pierre-Étienne 
Flandin, who distributed numerous leaflets and tracts around Paris 
advocating a peaceful settlement of the Czechoslovakian crisis. Moreover, on 
14 September, he informed the British Prime Minister that French public 
opinion ‘is more likely to be in the direction of non-intervention than that of 
intervention’.39 Flandin also made his opinions known to the British press, 
commenting to staff at the Paris offices of the Daily Express that ‘the Chief of 
the French Army had told him that a French defeat was certain’. The 
majority of the French people desired peace, he continued, ‘[i]t is the 
communists and the Jews who are leading us into this war. They are 
determined to push us into it’.40 Although Flandin’s comments were in 
keeping with the ‘neo-pacifism’ adopted by sections of the French right from 
the mid-1930s,41 the extent to which it reflected a genuine pacifist 
sentiment must be questioned. Indeed, it can be seen as political 
profiteering, the right seeking to exploit an underlying war anxiety by 
                                                 
39 TNA, PREM 1/249: Flandin to Chamberlain, 14 September 1938. 
40 House of Lords Record Office, Beaverbrook Papers, BBK/B/293: Letter to Beaverbrook 
from Lord Forbes (from the Paris offices of the Daily Express), 25 September 1938, detailing 
notes of an interview with Flandin. 
41 The notion of a conservative ‘neo-pacifism’ was noted as early as 1943 by C. Micaud, The 
French Right and Nazi Germany, pp. 152 and passim.  J. Jackson has also used this 
terminology, in France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944, (Oxford, 2001), pp. 89-92, as has 
Azéma, De Munich à la libération, pp. 12-14. 
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castigating leftist war mongering. Flandin allegedly remarked that he had 
embraced pacifism in order to avoid a leftist ‘monopoly of the pacifist 
platform, which was bringing them so much electoral success’.42 
 Nevertheless, reactive representations of opinion during September 
1938 largely reinforced the residual representation of widespread pacifism. 
The French teaching and postal unions petitioned Daladier on 26 September 
to argue against going to war over the Sudeten question, reinforcing the 
belief that these unions remained a bastion of pacifism.43 Furthermore, the 
pacifist fringe of the SFIO advocated a similar line. ‘Naturally, the Sudeten 
problem is the most critical, the most pressing to be resolved’, wrote Paul 
Faure on 18 September, ‘and it must be done by pacific means’.44 Similarly, 
at a meeting of the SFIO Parliamentary Group on 29 September, Faure told 
Jean Zyromski, prominent within the Bataille Socialiste section of the SFIO, 
that he would rather be accused of being Hitlerite than be accused of war-
mongering, a response applauded by a large majority of those in 
attendance.45 
 Although Faure’s position can be defined as pacifism, it would be 
disingenuous to label as ‘pacifists’ all those who favoured a peaceful solution 
to the Czechoslovakian crisis. Léon Blum, for example, had largely 
abandoned a pacifist position by 1938, yet he welcomed Chamberlain’s 
decision to fly to Germany in an effort to resolve the crisis peacefully 
through discussions with Hitler. ‘[T]he audacious decision of M. Neville 
Chamberlain’, wrote Blum, ‘[is] a chance for peace …. That is why I applaud 
… we applaud all that renders war more difficult’.46 Moreover, even Hitler’s 
increased demands at the Godesberg meeting with Chamberlain on 22 
September failed to lead to a hardening of opinion analogous to that seen in 
                                                 
42 Flandin’s comments as relayed by Lévy, The Truth about France, p. 119. 
43 M .Vaïsse, ‘Le passé insupportable: les pacifismes, 1984, 1938, 1914’, Vingtième Siècle, 3 
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45 APP, BA/1685: Police report, 29 September 1938, ‘À la Chambre’. 
46 Le Populaire, 15 September 1938. 
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Britain.47 As Lacaze has noted, ‘if Hitler’s Godesberg demands provoked 
unanimous resistance in the British press, this unanimity was not 
encountered in the Parisian newspapers’.48 
The majority of reactive representations of opinion therefore reinforced 
the belief that pacifism remained prominent. This was certainly the British 
interpretation, and when Daladier and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Georges Bonnet, visited London on 25 and 26 September, the British 
ministers did not hesitate to suggest that French opinion was unwilling to go 
to war. As Daladier recalled, ‘they invoked French newspapers advocating 
submission to Hitler [and] the hostility of a section of French opinion’. 
Daladier retorted, ‘at this moment a million Frenchmen pass to the frontiers, 
without any incident and without weakness of morale. You ask me, without 
enthusiasm? Do you believe, therefore, that it is with enthusiasm that I have 
asked them to respond to my appeal?’ 49 If Daladier’s confessed lack of 
enthusiasm for war reflected a latent war anxiety, Bonnet was convinced 
that these anxieties were shared by the mass of French opinion: ‘[D]o you 
know what war is like?’ he asked the journalist Geneviève Tabouis, ‘War 
with bombs?’ ‘If war breaks out’, he continued, ‘there will be a revolution, 
and the people will throw me into the river’.50 The policymaking elites were 
acutely conscious of a widespread war anxiety, as practically everyone in 
France were apprehensive of the potential repercussions of a Franco-
German conflict. But a lack of enthusiasm for war is not indicative of 
pacifism, and few preached a policy of peace at any price. The dominant 
reactive representations of opinion indicated that whilst there was, as Blum 
put it, a ‘chance of peace’, this had to be seized. War anxiety rather than 
pacifism thus ensured that the Munich Agreement would be embraced. 
                                                 
47 On 23 September, Halifax sent a telegram to Chamberlain at Godesberg, noting: ‘Great 
mass of public opinion seems to be hardening in sense of feeling that we have gone to the 
limit of concession’. D[ocuments] on B[ritish] F[oreign] P[olicy], iii, 2, no. 1058. 
48 L’opinion publique française et la crise de Munich, p. 272. Jean Zay, Daladier’s Education 
Minister, lamented how ‘the press campaign for French neutrality (République, Journal, 
Matin, Flandin) has led to our retreat and portrayed us as divided in Hitler’s eyes’. J. Zay, 
Carnets secrets (de Munich à la guerre), (Paris, 1942), p. 8. 
49 A[rchives] N[ationales] Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/10, 2DA3 Dr. 2, sdra: Conférence de 
Londres, 25-26 September 1938: Notes manuscrites d’Édouard Daladier.  
50 Cited in Geneviève Tabouis, They Called me Cassandra, written in collaboration with 
Helen Scott, (New York, 1942), p. 355 (original emphasis). 
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III 
 
Daladier, much to his surprise, returned from Munich to a hero’s welcome.51 
The initial fervour that welcomed the maintenance of peace appeared to 
most contemporary observers as heartfelt, genuine, and thoroughly 
understandable. Confirmation of this widespread sentiment was provided by 
the newspaper Œuvre, which noted that of the letters they had received from 
the public on the issue of Munich, 4,555 approved the agreement with only 
193 voicing dissent.52 Furthermore, it was not only the French press that 
lavished praise on the British Prime Minister, as many French towns 
renamed streets in his honour, umbrellas were referred to as ‘mon 
Chamberlain’, and a new dance, ‘Le Chamberlain’, swept Paris.53 The 
overriding reactive representation of opinion in the immediate aftermath of 
Munich was relief that war had been averted, reinforcing the residual 
representation of a society so infused with pacifist sentiment that recourse 
to war was unthinkable. 
Support for Munich was also evident in parliamentary circles, with 
only the communists, the nationalist deputy Henri de Kérillis, and a sole 
socialist deputy voting against them in the French Chamber. Indeed, even 
Socialists who had abandoned pacifism welcomed the maintenance of peace. 
As Blum told the Chamber, ‘The French people feel an immense elation to 
have avoided a war that had been so close’.54 Inevitably, marginal pacifist 
organisations also embraced the Munich accords. The LICP claimed that 
gratitude for the reprieve belonged not to Daladier and Bonnet, but to those 
                                                 
51 For an account of Daladier’s return from Munich see É. de Crouy-Chanel, Alexis Léger: ou 
l’autre visage de Saint-John Perse, (Paris, 1989), p. 235. Bonnet subsequently informed 
Lucien Lamoureux, a Deputy and former Minister, that Daladier, on the plane returning 
from Munich, ‘was sombre and preoccupied. He dreaded the welcome that the people of 
Paris had in store for him’. (Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine: 
Papiers Lucien Lamoureux, ‘Souvenirs politiques’, Mfm 31). 
52 Œuvre, 4 October 1938. 
53 R. and I. Tombs, That Sweet Enemy: The French and the British from the Sun King to the 
Present, (London, 2006), p. 534. 
54 Blum, speech to the Chambre des députés, 4 October 1938, Journal Officiel de la 
République Français, Débats et comptes-rendus, chambre des députés (hereafter JO), séance 
du 4 octobre 1938. For more on Blum’s attitude during the Czechoslovakian crisis, see N. 
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pacifists who imposed ‘a psychosis of peace’ and thus ‘rendered an immense 
service to humanity’.55 These expressions of public and political opinion are 
often cited as evidence of the French people’s lingering pacifism. Jean-Pierre 
Azéma, for example, has remarked that Munich marked the end of an era, 
the culmination of the pacifism borne out of the ‘Der des der’.56  
However, not all those who approved the Munich accords were 
pacifists. Support for Munich was, above all, an expression of relief that war 
had been avoided. It was not necessarily the final, desperate act of pacifism, 
but simply another expression of war anxiety. The ‘cowardly shame and 
relief’ evoked by Blum was certainly more akin to war anxiety than a 
doctrinal pacifist position.57 Furthermore, war anxiety not only explains 
public reaction to Munich, but also the hardening of opinion thereafter. 
Indeed, it is already accepted that French opinion was more divided than 
initially thought, with an October 1938 opinion poll showing only 57% 
approval for the Munich accords.58 Undoubtedly, this figure did not 
correspond with the 87.5% vote of approval in the Chamber, supporting the 
Communist Jacques Duclos’ claim that the ‘parliamentary votes do not 
translate the amplitude of popular protest’.59 Moreover, the same poll 
revealed that 70% believed that France and Britain must resist any further 
German demands. Therefore, even amongst those who had approved of 
Munich, there was a significant belief that it must not be repeated. This 
seemingly paradoxical position – support for Munich coupled with the belief 
that analogous concessions would be intolerable - is more compatible with 
war anxiety than pacifism. Far from retreating into a pacifist shell or 
defeatist mindset, French opinion in the aftermath of Munich suggested that 
a firmer foreign policy would be embraced. 
First and foremost, this concerned the state of French defences, and 
the belief that French military weakness had been pivotal in the decision to 
                                                 
55 APP, BA/1777: Police report, 1 November 1938, citing a speech made by Aurèle Patorni 
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56 Azéma, De Munich à la libération, p.18. 
57 Le Populaire, 19 September 1938. 
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appease Germany. Military considerations had certainly been foremost in 
Daladier’s mind during the Czechoslovakian crisis, particularly aerial 
deficiencies. A note on air power by General Vuillemin, Chief of the French 
Air Staff, of 26 September, was described by Daladier as ‘more pessimistic 
than normal’.60 Such concerns undoubtedly influenced French policy, and 
were subsequently the subject of press discussion. Blum was convinced that 
‘the comparative reports on military aviation played a considerable role’ in 
the frantic diplomacy of the previous weeks.61 Furthermore, the need for 
protection against aerial bombardment became prominent, and several 
French newspapers vehemently campaigned for French aerial deficiencies to 
be rectified. On 15 October, l’Intransigeant carried the headline: ‘Planes! 
planes! Is France resigned to die or does she have the will to live?’ This 
campaign would continue for the next week, vigorously urging the necessity 
of augmenting French air power.62    
It soon became apparent that support for Munich was ephemeral, 
suggesting that the instinctive relief at avoiding war was motivated by 
residual anxieties regarding the ‘next war’ rather than a deeply-rooted 
pacifism. Certainly, there was little indication of doctrinal pacifism by late 
November 1938, when the majority of the French public rallied behind the 
government’s firm response to the Italian demands for Corsica, Nice and the 
Haut-Savoie. Daladier’s statement to the Chamber that ‘France will not cede 
an inch of territory’63 was well-received by French newspapers of all political 
persuasions.64 Indeed, press reactions to the Italian claims were 
characterized by incredulity and disdain. Even the far right, which had 
espoused a neo-pacifist agenda at the time of Munich - the headline in the 
Action française on 28 September read, ‘Non! Pas la Guerre!’ - rejected the 
outlandish Italian demands. Je Suis Partout dismissed the demands as 
having ‘the exact same intrinsic value as the demands of my little daughter: 
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they are the words of children’. This, it was argued, was very different from 
Munich: ‘since our possessions are targeted, the peace of Munich is not a 
precedent’.65 
As France galvanized around a firm response to Mussolini, reactive 
representations of opinion no longer reinforced the residual representation 
of pacifism. Daladier’s visit to North Africa and Corsica in early January 
1939, widely covered not only in the printed press but also in cinema 
newsreels, contributed to an upsurge in patriotic sentiment and, moreover, 
of pride and faith in the loyalty and strength of the French Empire.66 
Mainstream popular culture also conveyed more optimistic messages. 
Within French cinema, the pacifist films of the early 1930s gave way to 
pictures that, whilst not glorifying war or revelling in the prospect of a future 
conflict, nonetheless portrayed French courage and ingenuity in face of the 
German menace. Bravery and guile replaced cowardice and decadence; the 
Maginot Line was celebrated, and the valour and glory of the Empire 
upheld.67 Officially sanctioned films sought to capitalize upon this perceived 
sentiment, with productions such as Unité française and Sommes-nous 
défendus reiterating France’s strength and unity. Unité française, released 
just after Daladier’s voyage, contained such statements as: ‘This country, 
pacific and tranquil ..., is capable of facing all attacks and all challenges’.68   
French opinion appeared to relish manifestations of French firmness 
and resolve. A government note suggested that the press ‘optimistically 
awaits the initial echoes of Daladier’s voyage in Tunisia’.69 Daladier’s visit, 
coupled with the unity of French opinion in light of the Italian demands, 
also helped convince Britain of French resolve, dissuading Chamberlain 
from seeking to mediate between Paris and Rome during his forthcoming 
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visit to the Italian capital. Daladier’s success in portraying a rediscovered 
French patriotism and unity was therefore propitious. ‘Nothing could better 
prepare the visit to Rome of Mr Chamberlain and Lord Halifax’ commented 
the Journal des débats, ‘than the present trip of M. Daladier’. Similarly, Le 
Populaire emphasized that the British must be made aware, in no uncertain 
terms, that France was prepared to cede absolutely nothing to Italy.70 
Reactive representations of French opinion in early 1939 
demonstrated that the French people were prepared, if necessary, to forcibly 
resist unreasonable demands. Simultaneously, representations of French 
pacifism became increasingly infrequent, gradually eroding the residual 
perception of a pacifist-infused populace. Indeed, within the SFIO, growing 
support for the blumiste position suggested that the pacifist paulfauristes 
were becoming marginalized. At the SFIO congress at Montrouge in late 
December 1938, Blum’s firmness triumphed over Paul Faure’s pacifism.71 
However, this did not mean that French socialists had suddenly become 
war-like. A latent war anxiety persisted, but a growing feeling that war must 
one day be confronted was coming to the fore. Nevertheless, the residual 
representation of pacifism had been significantly superseded, permitting and 
even encouraging the French government to pursue a foreign policy of 
firmness rather than capitulation.   
Following the German occupation of the rump Czech state on 15 
March 1939, reactive representations reinforced the perception of a public 
rapidly losing patience with the dictators. Opinion now appeared to demand 
that a firm policy be adopted not only towards Mussolini but also towards 
Hitler. If the public’s response to the Italian demands had challenged the 
residual representation of widespread pacifism, the Prague coup suggested 
that such residuals had lost their potency. Pacifism was increasingly 
marginalized, confined to integral pacifists and those on the right for whom 
a fusion of fascist sympathies and virulent anti-communism manifested 
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itself in a form of ‘neo-pacifism’. The majority of the French public, by 
contrast, appeared to accept that war might be unavoidable, and that it was 
better to prepare for it than seek to avoid it at any price. For Blum, such 
resolve was not incompatible with pacifism: ‘This is the state to which the 
dictators have left Europe. For us Socialists, for us pacifists, the appeal of 
force is today the appeal for peace’.72  
 
IV 
 
Nevertheless, although doctrinal pacifist sentiment had been eroded since 
Munich, anxieties regarding the prospect of war had not been eradicated. 
Throughout the summer of 1939, war anxiety continued to linger, with 
certain representations of opinion questioning the wisdom of upholding the 
guarantee to Poland and fighting for Danzig. On 4 May, Marcel Déat 
published a now infamous article entitled ‘Mourir pour Dantzig?’ Déat’s 
argument was straightforward: ‘Fighting side by side with our Polish friends 
for the common defence of our territories, our rights, our freedoms, is a 
prospect we can envisage with courage, if it contributes to the maintenance 
of peace. But die for Danzig? No!’73 Déat’s argument was, however, simply a 
marginal and extreme manifestation of wider anxieties regarding the 
prospect of war. More common was the lingering influence of war anxiety 
displayed by Daladier when he told the Chamber of Deputies on 11 May that 
‘war will resolve none of the present problems. On the contrary, it will render 
the solution more difficult and more disastrous’.74 Nonetheless, Daladier 
was convinced that this must not amount to capitulation, a conviction 
supported by the majority of the French press. In contrast to Déat, the 
majority of reactive representations of opinion continued to favour a firm 
stance towards the dictatorships.75  
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Certainly, there were few adherents to Déat’s position, largely confined 
to the integral pacifists of the LICP who expressed a similar sentiment in 
their journal, Le Barrage, under the headline ‘La Guerre de Dantzig n’aura 
pas lieu’.76 Indeed, mainstream opinion is arguably better reflected by an 
opinion poll showing that 76% of respondents believed that France should, if 
necessary, use force to preserve the status of Danzig.77 Right wing ‘neo-
pacifism’ certainly subsided, and its more notorious proponents became 
increasingly estranged from mainstream conservative opinion. William Irvine 
has observed that by the end of 1938 Flandin had ‘become an obvious 
embarrassment to many leaders of the party [the Alliance Démocratique] 
who took some pains to distance themselves publicly from his Munich 
stance’.78 Moreover, in late 1938 and early 1939, the mainstream 
conservative press did not endorse the pro-German or pro-fascist rhetoric 
evident in such journals as Je Suis Partout or Gringoire.  
In short, Daladier’s firmness was more attuned to the perceived 
demands of the majority of French public opinion. Since Munich, reactive 
representations had revealed a growing determination to resist the dictators, 
eroding the residual representation of a public infused with pacifism and 
thus willing to countenance concession and capitulation for the sake of 
peace. Somewhat paradoxically, war anxiety actually added impetus to a 
firm foreign policy, as deterring Hitler by means of a ‘peace bloc’ was 
considered the most effective way of maintaining peace. Consequently, only 
extremist sections of opinion, such as far-right anti-Semitic organisations, 
integral pacifists, or isolated groups of far-left socialist revolutionaries 
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continued to preach a strictly pacifist agenda. The Étudiants anti-juifs 
published a tract claiming: ‘The Jew is the war....  Guilty for, and beneficiary 
of, the slaughter of 1914, the Judeo-Masonic capitalists prepare a new war 
in which you will be the first victims’. On the other side of the political 
spectrum, an orator at a meeting of the Union des Amicales 
Socialistes remarked, ‘We estimate ... that between a war for Hitler’s ‘living 
space’ and another for the defence of Daladier’s Empire, there is a place for 
peace created by Socialism’.79  
However, such tendencies of opinion were marginal. Another tract 
intercepted by the police, distributed by de Kérillis, was more attuned to 
mainstream French opinion. ‘[E]vents have spoken. And the average 
Frenchman has clearly understood that the policy of concession has pitifully 
failed and that it is necessary to find another policy’.80 To sustain a firm 
foreign policy, France required domestic unity, discipline and resolve. As the 
Minister of Finance, Paul Reynaud, told the French people on 29 July, ‘It is 
essential that the spirit of defeatism should disappear …, that the French 
people should not abandon the spirit of sacrifice, cease to believe in France, 
or once again fall back on facile ideas’.81 Reynaud’s comments suggest that 
the French elites remained concerned by certain residual representations of 
French opinion, and his allusion to defeatism was doubtless inspired by 
Déat’s ‘Mourir pour Dantzig?’ article. Evidently, the residual representation 
of pacifism – which even at the time was equated with defeatism - had yet to 
completely dissipate.  
This was amply reflected during the final days of peace. As Jean-
Baptiste Duroselle has noted, the French Cabinet was divided between the 
‘resisters’ and the ‘pacifists’.82 Beyond the Cabinet, several other influential 
figures were also reluctant to maintain the Polish commitment, including 
Jean Mistler, the President of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the French 
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Chamber, and his counterpart in the Senate, Henry Bérenger. Bonnet, 
however, remained the most influential ‘pacifist’, and on 1 September he 
urged the British government to share his conviction that, ‘until the last 
moment, no effort be neglected in attempting to restore the peace’.83 
Similarly, die-hard advocates of ‘neo-pacifism’ such as Flandin pleaded that 
peace ‘is still possible’.84  
Of course, French leaders were aware that French opinion was not 
enthused by the prospect of war. On 26 August, Daladier addressed a 
personal message to the German Chancellor, as one war veteran to another, 
re-iterating French determination to uphold her pledges to Poland, although 
expressing the hope that a peaceful solution to the Danzig imbroglio could 
be found. Daladier once more reflected a general war anxiety in prophesizing 
the repercussions of a conflict: ‘If French and German blood is spilt again …, 
in a longer and bloodier war, then both will fight confident of their own 
victory. But what is most certain is that devastation and barbarism will be 
the victor’.85 Moreover, in his radio broadcast to the French people on 3 
September, Daladier stressed that France, a peaceful nation, was only going 
to war ‘because it has been imposed on us’.86 This interpretation was echoed 
throughout the French press. ‘War has been imposed on France and she has 
no choice but to fight’, was the verdict of l’Intransigeant.87 Similarly, Blum 
argued that ‘the Nazis have compelled the most peaceful of nations to go to 
war for the defence of her liberty, existence and honour’.88  
 
For the French government, reactive representations of opinion since 
Munich indicated that the majority of the French population was morally 
prepared for war.89 Although war was certainly not desired, it was accepted, 
and the lingering anxieties regarding the prospect of war did not equate to a 
                                                 
83 AN, Fonds Daladier, 496 AP/14, 2 DA 7 Dr. 6 sdra: Georges Bonnet to Charles Corbin (by 
telephone), 1 September 1939. 
84 Paris-Soir, 29 August 1939. 
85 Fonds Genebrier, GE15: Daladier’s letter to Hitler, 26 August 1939. 
86 Speech by Daladier, broadcast by radio on the evening of 3 September 1939, cited in 
Œuvre, 4 September 1939. 
87 Intransigeant, 2 September 1939. 
88 Le Populaire, 4 September 1939. 
89 This conclusion thus confirms that of Crémieux-Brilhac, Les Français de l’An 40. 
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visceral pacifism that made a French defeat inevitable.90 If war remained, as 
Talbot Imlay has suggested, ‘an unacceptable prospect for large sections of 
the French political spectrum’, elite perceptions of public opinion persuaded 
them that war had been reluctantly accepted.91 In sum, reactive 
representations of French opinion no longer perpetuated the residual 
representation of widespread pacifism. Therefore, the situation in September 
1939 was very different from the situation just one year earlier. At the time 
of Munich, numerous vocal reactive representations, emanating from the 
traditional pacifists of the political left to the ‘neo-pacifism’ of the far right, 
continued to reinforce the perception of a pacifist French public hostile to 
going to war. After Munich, these reactive representations increasingly 
yielded to demands for a firmer foreign policy. 
The fact that these representations yielded so rapidly suggests that 
they were never an accurate barometer of wider French opinion; they were 
simply more voluble, creating the impression that pacifism was more 
widespread than was actually the case. Of course, pacifist doctrine appealed 
to many French men and women, as no-one desired war. But this desire to 
avoid war can be better defined as war anxiety. Indeed, in the post-Munich 
period, reactive representations of opinion suggested that the only way to 
avoid war was to deter Germany through French strength and resolve. In 
essence, therefore, war anxiety is compatible with a determination to fight. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this article to trace the evolution of opinion 
during the drôle de guerre – a subject worthy of a study in its own right – it 
can be concluded that French opinion at the start of the Second World War 
was certainly not riddled with pacifism and defeatism. Consequently, the 
conditions for the defeat of 1940 - and subsequently for Vichy - were far 
from established. 
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